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II. LESSORS AND VENDORS OF REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY.
In the preceding part of this article I it has been seen that
while the obligation to refrain from injurious action is gen-
eral upon all men, however placed, and extends to all within
the radius of the effects of their acts, the- obligation to take
affirmative precautions to secure the safety of others is by
no means so extensive.2 Such duties are only imposed upon
1 53 Am c xc LAw REaisma, 2o9.
'It is submitted that all affirmative duties rest 'upon consideration:
some benefit to him on whom they are imposed. A master is only
liable for the acts of his servant not directly commanded by him when
and because he is engaged in the furtherance of the master's business,
see supra, pages 238-24o, and in all cases in which one who employs
an independent contractor is liable for his careless work, it will be
found that it is where an affirmative duty, which can only be dis-
charged by full performance, has been entrusted to the contractor and
by his default has been imperfectly performed. Every one of these
affirmative duties rests upon some consideiation moving to the ob-
ligor; such as, among others, the exercise of some franchise, the use
of one's property for some directly gainful purpose, Francis v. Cock-
rell, 5 Q. B. 5o; or the exercise of some quasi public calling, such as
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those who have voluntarily assumed a position or relation
from -vhich a benefit is derived by them. It has been seen
that the daty to maintain either structures or chattels in
safe condition rests upon him who uses, or causes them to
be used, for his purposes. And in the case of chattels, at
least, that such duty does not depend upon possession of the
chattel, control over it, 3 or present or even past ownership
of it,4 save in this, that wheze the-chattel was in good con-
dition when it passed from the possession and control of him
who supplied it, he, having done all that he could, was not
bound to answer for any subsequent deterioration. How-
ever, while in the cases so far discussed, the chattel is out of
the defendant's possession, it is being used directly in the
defendant's business. There is another and more usual and
important class of cases where the only interest in the use
is indirect, where the article is leased to another that he may
use it for his purposes. Now, most property, real as well
as personal, may be put to many uses. A defect may exist
which renders it dangerous if put to certain uses, but which
does not in the least unfit it for others. Even the most
ruinous of premises may be used safely, if only by pulling
them down; the most worn-out machine may be safely used
as scrap-iron. As has been seen, an owner of property in
full possession and control thereof is not bound to put it
in such perfect condition that it can be safely used for any
purpose by anyone. He need only have it fit for the use
to which he may choose to put it. If, then, the premises
or article rented or sold be capable of any safe use, it is
the lessee or vefidee who is in fault if he puts it to a use
for which its condition makes it dangerous. "A landlord
who lets a house in a dangerous' state is not liable to the
that of carrier of passengers. Of course, when the injury is caused by
the very act which the contractor has been employed to do, Penny v.
Winebledon, L IL (898) I Q. B. D. 212, or some -necessary part
thereof, Pickard v. Smith, io C. B. N. S. 470, a different principle
applies. The employer is liable because he has personally caused the
injurious thing to be done.
'Hcaven v. Pender, %s.pra, page 29; Mulholland v. R. R., supra,
page 232-
'Elliott v. Hale, supra, page 23z.
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tenants, customers, or guests 5 for accidents happening dur-
ing the term. "Fraud apart, there is no law against letting
a tumble-down house." 6
Now, the foundation of this immunity may be either some
rule of public policy which aims to expedite and encourage
the transfer of property by freeing the transferrer from all
subsequent liability by the substitution of the new tenant
or owner in his stead, as is indicated by many of the opin-
ions, 7 or it may result from this, that the lessee or vendee
with knowledge of the defect (and the doctrine of caveat
emptor requires him to know it if it be patent to inspection)
need not be expected to use the premises in a way for which
it is then to his knowledge dangerous." Such a result is
not probable, so no danger is threatened to anyone, no wrong
committed. No principle of public policy would, of course,
protect the vendor who has been guilty of fraud; nor, if a
defect was fraudulently concealed by the lessor or vendor,
would there be any reason to anticipate that the lessee or
vendee should refrain from any particular use of the prem-
ises or chattel. In fact, the very object of the concealment
would naturally be to hold it out as fit for all purposes, and
so increase its value and effect a sale or lease.
A stranger, one whose proximity to the property 9 is in
the exercise of some right of his own, and not by the per-
mission of and in the right of the lessee, may recover against
'He would, however, be liable to a passerby on an abutting highway
if he were injured by a fall of bricks, etc., from the ruinous structure.
Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C B. 782.
•Erle, C. J. Robbins v. Jones, i5 C. B. N. S. 221. Willes, J., in
fact prepared the opinion.
"See Curtlin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70; Huset v. Co., i2o Fed. 86-.
"This conception of the legal improbability of wrongful action by
others, though in fact perfectly expectable according to the known
habits of mankind, was originally prevalent throughout the whole law
of torts, but has been repudiated in all cases save those dealing with
the obligations of owners of real estate, where archaic conceptions are
preserved by the conservative attitude of the courts thereto. Such
conceptions are often, by the analogies of real property law, applied
also to cases dealing with the obligation of the owners or even makers
of personal property. See infra, where this is discussed at greater
length.
'This can usually occur only in cases of real estate. Though see
Lossee v. Buchanan, Sr N. Y. 479, where suit, however, was brought
against the purchaser of a defective boiler.
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the lessor who leases the premises in a ruinous condition for
injuries received thereby; one coming on the premises in
the right of a lessee may not. Why is this? If the immunity
be the result of public policy, then there should be no dif-
ference between the two. If, on the contrary, it is owing to
the fact that the defect being known to the lessee, there is.
no reason to expect that he will use the premises in a way
for which it is unfit, the distinction is obviously sound. For,
while such a building must until repaired remain a danger
to those the exercise of whose rights 10 force them to come
within the reach of it, there is no reason to expect that the
lessee will invite either customer or guests to come on the
premises without warning until he has put them in a condition
fit for their reception. The right of one coming upon the
premises, even on the occupier's business, or using the chat-
tels of another for his purposes, is not to have the premises
or chattels made safe, it is either to have them made safe
or, in the alternative, to have notice given him that they are
unsafe.
When, however, the premises are rented for the purpose
of being at once thrown open to the public for its use for a
purpose for which its condition unfits it, the lessor has been
held liable to anyone of the public injured. In Barrett v.
Lake Ontario Beach Co." a diving-chute had been erected
by the defendant and leased to a company, who operated it.
The defendant was the owner of an amusement park of
which the diving-chute formed one of the attractions. The
railings around the platform were not sufficiently close to-
gether, and the plaintiff, who had paid for admission to the
chute, slipped on the wet platform, fell firough the railing,
and was injured. It was held that he could recover against
the lessor. "If," said Gray, J., "the premises. be rented
for public use for which the lessor knows they are unfit and
dangerous, he is guilty of negligence." When the defect
is patent, the court conceded that the tenant may also be-lia-
ble. There, however, was no fraud or concealment. "The
"Persons using abutting highways and adjacent property owners.,11174 N. Y. 3io, following Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28.
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liability for the unfit condition of the pr:emises which had
been let for a specific purpose rests upon tMe omission to use
due care in their erection and construction." "The essential
principle is the omission or neglect in preparing a stru,:r.ure
to be put to a particular public use to make it reasonably fit
and safe for that use." "Such instances (of liability) are
where one lets a warehouse so imperfectly constructed that
the floors will not support the weight necessarily put. on
them." 12
Fox v. Buffalo Co.a goes even further, for there the lessor
of a race-track and a grand stand appurtenant thereto was
held liable to a person injured by the fall of a defectively
constructed stand, though the plaintiff had not purchased
the ticket by which he obtained admission. " In ordinary
cases," said Ward, J., "there is no implied warranty (no
duty) that buildings leased for ordinary purposes are safe
for such purposes. The ruie is different in regard to build-
ings and structures in which public entertainments are de-
signed to be given, and for admision to which the lessors
directly or indirectly receive compensation. There the les-
sors hold out the structures as fit for use for such purpose,
and undertake that due care (and that the highest) has been
exercised in their erection. The defect was one of original
construction. The defendant itself created an unsafe and
dangerous structure; it was its duty to know that the
structure was safe, or at least to exercise the highest degree
of care to that end." 14
'See Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. xlz, and Godley v. Haggerty, 20 Pa.
387, two cases arising out of the same accident. The defendant was
himself personally in default; he had chosen to be his own -architect
and his plans were defective. The building was built for the express
purpose of being leased by the United States Customs for heavy stor-
age under arrangement with the government, who were to take it
over as soon as completed. Then there was both misfeasance and
interest in the particular use to which the building was to be imme-
diately put, and the case was clearer than Fox v. Buffalo Co. In the
one case an owner of goods stored in the building, In the other a
man working therein, was allowed to recover for injuries sustained
by its fall. The cases, while often criticised by the Pennsylvania
courts, have never been overruled.
"2r App. Div. (N. Y.) 32I.
' This means a duty such as a railroad owes to its passengers in
regard to its roadbed and rolling-stock-a duty to answer for it that
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The distinction seems to be between the lease of a build-
ing and the lease of a specific use thereof. In the first case
the lessor has no interest or profit out of the particular use,
in the latter he has. "The defendant participated in the
profits of the undertaking with the lessee; on the single day
on which it was rented, it had received two hundred dollars
rental. It was thus a party to the wrong of holding out an
invitation to come upon this dangerous structure"--ie., for
the purpose of the lessor's business, as well as that of the
lessee. The rental value of the property depended upon its
immediate fitness for this use. The rent was paid, not for
so much land, but for a race-track with the appurtenances
necessary for its immediate use as such; the defendant's
business might properly be said to be the renting of racing
facilities."5 The test would seem to be whether the lessor
is interested in the particular use in which the injury is
sustained, whether the property is to be put to such use im-
mediately in its existing condition,15a and whether the con-
dition of the property and the use for which it is leased are
such that injury is threatened to the public, or any particular
class therein, if it be not in safe condition. Such seems to
be the conception of the public use of which the court speaks
early in its decision. In Barrett v. Ontario Beach Co. it
must be noted that as a defect had arisen from originally
faulty construction, the owners were liable without notice,
care is taken in their construction, by whomsoever they delegate such
construction; not to insure the safety of passengers, but to insure that
care" has been taken to provide for their safety. Here, as in Francis
v. Cockrell, I- R. 5 Q. B. 5oi, the stand was built by a competent
builder under the super~ision and from the plans of a competent archi-
tect.2 Such, too, was the position of the defendant in Camp v. Wood,
76 N. Y. 99, who made a business of leasing the use and control of
his premises for the night for dances and other village entertainments,
and of the defendant in Green v. Winters, 17 Misc. 5o, infra, who
did not lease a wagon to the club for its use generally, but who sup-
plied a picnic wagon for the very purpose of taking the club on its
usual excursion-he leased not the wagon, but its use for picnic
purposes-it was its fitness for that which gave it its rental value.
See also Campbell v. Company, 62 Me. 582; Wendell v. Baxter, 6
Gray (Mass.), 494.
", In Barrett v. Co. the lessee was expressly prohibited by the lease
from making any alterations in the structure without the lessor's
written consent.
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but that " if the dangerous conditions arose from some cause,
such as decay, intervening after construction, notice or
means of knowledge might have been imported." There
would be in the latter case, however, not a mere duty to dis-
close known defects, but a duty to take affirmative steps
to inspect in order to ascertain if any defects existed. The
duty is still an affirmative one. It is to take care that the
premises shall be fit for the particular use in which the lessor
has an interest, from which he receives a benefit, indirect,
it is true, but still a benefit derived from the particular use.
The case seems identical in principle to Heaven v. Pender.
There, too, the chattel had passed out of the defendant's
hands, it, too. was leased as part of the docking facilities
let to the shipowners for immediate use for a purpose for
which it was unfit, arid so dangerous. That the dockowner
retained possession of the docks as a whole could make no
difference; the dockage of the particular dock had been
let and all the appliances and tackle had passed into the
possession and control of the shipowners. They were being
used directly in the business of the ship-painter. The dock-
owners' interest in the use was as indirect as that of the
defendant in Fox v. Buffalo Co.; he was interested in their
use, because, since his docks could not have been rented for
repair purposes without them, he obtained an enhanced
rental by furnishing the necessary appliances for repair.18
The court in Heaven v. Pender had no difficulty in holding
that the defective staging and appliances were furnished by
the dockowner for use in his business, a use in which he had
an interest and from which he derived a benefit
No legitimate distinction can be drawn between the lease
of a chattel or structure for use on the premises of the
lessor, whether the lessor retains possession generally of
such premises, as in Heaven v. Pender, or not, as in Fox v.
Buffalo Co., and the lease of a chattel to be used elsewhere.
"Just as in Fox v. Buffalo Co., without the stand the track was
unrentable for exhibition. purposes. It will be remembered that, in
the lower court, Case, J., likened the defendant in Heaven v. Pender
to a landlord who had parted with possession, and also that in his
opinion the evidence did not show any defect at the time of transfer.
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Interest in, bencfit from, a particular use, and not the locality
of the use nor the possession or control of the chattel, deter-
mines the obligation. So, in Winters v. Green 17 it was
held that the lessor of a coach furnished for a particular
use and defective for such use through his negligence was
liable to a person ;ajured in consequence of these defects.
The defendant had leased the coach to a social club for use
at its annual picnic. The plaintiff was the guest of a mem-
ber of the club. The hire was probably paid out of the club's
treasury, not by members who went -on the picnic; certainly
the plaintiff paid nothing. Daly, P. J., said: "The injury
sustained was due to the breach of the defendant's duty to
furnish a reasonably safe machine in good order for the pur-
pose for which it was hired. For this breach of duty the
defendant is liable to a guest of the club as well as to one
of its members. . . The defendant would not be liable
to a stranger-i.e., a person not connected with the club or
a member not carrying out some right which the club had
in using the coach pursuant to the contract. Recovery must
be confined to the lessee or a person connected with him in
carrying out some right which he had under the contract
of hire." While the obligation is not confined to parties
to the consideration or to the contract, it does not extend
beyond those who, in view of the contract, may be expected
to use the coach. The obligation does not arise out of the
contract, but out of the relation assumed under it, and the
contract may be shown not as creative of rights and obli-
gations, but as giving notice to the defendant of the extent
of the injury threatened by a breach of his duty..
It may be safely said that, Ist, one who furnishes an
article or structure for use for a purpose in which he has an
interest, direct or indirect, and from which he derives directly
or indirectly a benefit, is bound to exercise care to have the
structure or article fit for such use.13
17 N. Y. Misc. 597; 40 N. Y. Supp. 659.
This is the generally accepted rule throughout the United States.
See Globe Co. v. Coughry, 56 N. Y. 126; Hayes v. R. R., 15o .Mass.
457; Bright v. Barrett, 88 Wisc. 289. A rather extreme case is that
of Fish Kerlin Gray Electric Co., 99 N. W. io92 (S. D., 19o4. The
defendant had erected an arc light in a church, and originally had
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2d. Such obligations can extend no further than the abil-
ity to satisfy them. Where the possession of the article or
structure is transferred, if it be at the time of transfer fit
for the use for which it is designed, the transferee is alone
responsible for any defects arising subsequently, since with
the possession and control passes the power to inspect and
repair; he is aJone able to observe and remedy such defects,
and his alone is the duty of inspection and repair.
Upon this latter principle depends the much cited and
generally misunderstood case of Winterbottom v. Wright.0
This case came before the court on demurrer. The decla-
ration alleged that the defendant had contracted to supply
to the Postmaster-General and keep in repair a mail coach,
and that by virtue of the said contract it was the duty of
the defendant to keep the coach in repair; that the plaintiff,
knowing and relying on the said contract, had engaged to
drive the coach, and that by reason of the defendant's dis-
regard of his contract and failure to perform his duty there-
under the coach became in a weak condition, and broke down
and injured the plaintiff.
In form, the only obligation alleged was clearly one,
arising solely by virtue of the contract to which the plaintiff
was not a party, but upon which he, knowing of its existence,
retained the ownersh;p of it, but had transferred it before the acci-
dent. They, however, agreed to furnish the electricity and to keep
the light and machinery connceted with it in good order. The light
had worked badly, the defendant sent a man to repair it; the repairs
were badly done and the lamp fell on the plaintiff, a member of the
church. It was held that the defendant's obligation was not terminated
by the transfer of the lamp, since they still continued to use it for the
transmission of their current, and so in the course of their business;
and also because they had contracted to keep the lamp in repair. The
case might also have been decided as it was on the ground that what-
ever their duty to repair might be, they were liable because they had
attempted to repair and repaired badly, misfeasance whether the under-
taking was gratuitous or not. See infra, page 285. But see Thomas v.
Mayville Gas Co., 56 S. W. (Ky.) 153; 53 L. P, A. 147, where an
electric-light corporation which used trolley-wires for the transmission
of its current was "chargeable with the duty to see that the wires were
properly insulated, and it as well as the Trolley -Company is liable for
a failure to perform that duty if a person is killed thereby.""io M. and W. io9 (x842), generally cited as authority for the
totally different rule that the maker of an article is freed by its sale
from all liabiliy, save to the vendee, for defects of original construc-
tion.
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had chosen to rely.20 In substance, the breach was a failure
to keep the coach in repair. There is no allegation in the
declaration that the coach when de'vered to the Postmaster
was in any way defective. In this it differs from the cases
of Heaven v. Pender, Elliott v. Hall, and Winters v. Green.
With the transfer of possession, the legal duty of repair had
passed to the Postmaster and rested solely upon him. Any
obligation to repair assumed by the lessor in his contract
must rest solely upon the contract, and not upon his position
as lessor of a coach for use as such. It would be a mere
arrangement between the Postmaster and himself by which
he assumed the burden of performance, but by which the
legal obligation and liability of the respective parties towards
others remained unchanged. Like similar agreements by
landlords in leases of real estate,21 and like statutes im-
posing upon abutting owners the cost of repairing side-
walks,2 it is the burden of performance, and not the obli-
gation, which is transferred. The party liable may make
what arrangements he pleases for the performance of his
duties; he still remains liable, and solely liable, for their
non-performance. The duty cannot be transferred. The
lessor becomes, as it were, an independent contractor for
the performance of the lessee's duty of repair. As Lord
Abinger said: "Here the action is brought simply because
the defendant was a contractor with another." And Rolfe,
B., said: "The breach of the defendant's duty stated in the
declaration is an omission to keep the carriage in a safe
condition, and when we examine the mode in which it is
alleged to have arisen, we find the statement that the de-
fendant assumed it under and by virtue of the contract.
The duty is shown to have arisen solely from the contract,
and the fallacy consists in the use of the word duty. If
' It must be remembered that at the time and in the 'court before
which the case came for decision the utmost accuracy of pleading was
still of essential importance.
= Tuttle v. Gilbert, i45 Mass. i69; Stock v. Boston, 140 Mass. 416;
Hahn v. Roach, 7 Northampton Co. Rep. (Pa.) 22.
'Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 4o5. The Pennsylvania rule by
a singular misconception of their own cases is contra. Mintzer v.
Hogg, 192 Pa. 137.
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a duty to the Postmaster, that is true; if to the plaintiff,
there is none." In form the duty was alleged to arise not
as a legal incident to the relation between the parties, but
solely by virtue of the contract; in substance, no duty existed
to repair save under the contract, for a lessor owes no duty
of repair after the property is transferred.2 s
What Lord Abinger says in his opinion must be read with
a clear conception of the point actually before the court.
He fully recognizes that where by contract a relation is
created to which the law attaches the obligation of care, such
obligation is not contractual in origin, and extends beyond
the parties to the contract. He, no doubt, takes too narrow
a view of the relations to which such duty is attached, but
his attention is not specifically directed to this point.24 He
also recognizes that for active misfeasance threatening and
causing injury to the public, the liability is not restricted to
the parties to the contract in the execution of which it is
committed.2 5 He is concerning himself with duties such
as that in the case in hand. It may well be that what he
says of the injustice, "that after the defendant had done
everything to the satisfaction of his employer in all matters
between them adjusted and the accounts settled, on the
footing of the contract, we should subject them to be ripped
open by this action of tort," may-be quite true, where the
duty is purely contractual; one which can affect no one
but the promisee, or even as here, where the burden of
performing a duty owed by the promisee to others is
' Omit the contract to repair after transfer, and the case becomes
that supposed by Cave, J., to exist in Heaven v. Pcnder, L. R. 9 Q. B.
D. 306, that the defect in the staging in that case had arisen after
transfer and that the lessees and not the defendant were, therefore,
liable for its condition, due, not to an original defect, but to lack ofrepair."He says unless some public duty be undertaken or a public nui-
sance created, no action of tort can be brought unless an action on
the contract would lie. There is no instance, he states, in which a
"party not privy to a contract with a carrier can maintain an action."
Only nine years after this began in Marshall v. York and Newcastle,
ii C. B. 665, that line of decision which has firmly estabiished the right
of anyone accepted as a passenger to recover in tort, though not privy
to the contract for his carrage.
' See note 24, "or public nuisance created."
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taken over by the contract. 28  VVhat is an adequate per-
formance of the -ontractual obligation concerns only the
parties, but where the contractor or lessor, by reason of his
position as such, owes a duty to others than his employer
or lessee, while the employer may be satisfied, the public
is not, so long as danger is threatened to it; while the ac-
counts between the parties to the contract are settled, the
contractor's whole liabilities are not discharged until he
has paid for all the injury he has done. As Baron Parke
says in Longincid v. Holliday,-7 " One who creates a public
nuisance cannot be saved from the consequences of his
wrongful act by showing that he was also guilty of a breach
of contract and responsible for it;" or that .he has paid
damages for it, or been excused therefrom. To deny re-
covery to the injured because of the inconvenience caused
to the guilty by the disturbance of their accounts. would be
the height of injustice.
Then, too, when Alderson, B., says, " The only safe rule
is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the
contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason
why we should not go fifty," it must again be remembered
that he was speaking of the right to recover for the breach
of an obligation arising both in form and substance solely
by virtue of the contract. His statement is no authority
for the position that an obligation imposed by law upon the
conduct of 'a business or a relation voluntarily assumed
should, because by a contract a similar duty has been ex-
pressly assumed towards some of them, be confined to these
latter only, among all of those for whose protection the duty
was imposed. While it is true that no one's rights can.be
enlarged by a contract to which he is no party, it is equally
true that they cannot be restricted or destroyed thereby.
' Such others have been in no way prejudiced by such delegation of
the performance, their remedy against him who originally owed the
duty is as available and complete as though he had attempted the
perfirmance of his duty in person or by his servants. In this case,
it is true, there was a duty of imperfect obligation, unenforceable
because of the public position of the Postmaster, but this was a risk
known to and assumed by all who dealt with him.
'6 Exc. 761.
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While the affirmative duty of seeing that an article is
in safe condition for a particular use rests on him who has
an interest in the particular use, direct or indirect, and while
a lessee in possession of such article, being the only person
able to observe the need of repairs, is alone obliged to main-
tain it in fit condition for use, the lessor, whether bound by
contract with his lessee to repair or not, may make himself
liable if he does make repairs and make them badly.28 He
is not bound to act, but he is bound, if he acts, not to act
carelessly. While under no duty to repair, and so not liable
for non-feasance, he is liable for active misfeasance. Nor
can he claim that he could not expect his tenant to use the
article while out of repair, for by his assuming and making
the repairs, he has led his tenant to believe that the article
had been rendered fit for use.29
Such, then, appears to be the effect of the cases dealing
with the obligation of lessors of real and personal property.
It remains to consider the effect of a transfer, not merely
of the possession, but of all title to the land or chattel, of
all interest in its future use, as where it is sold or where a
contractor hands over a finished article or structure to his
employer.
Many influences have tended to confuse and to cloud this
question. It is possible to look at the matter from many
sides. It deals with the rights and obligations of property
subject, as they are, to highly technical and artificial rules
" Gregor v. Cady, 82 Me. 131; Gill v. Middlelon, io5 Mass. 477.
:'Unless he actually makes repairs and does so badly, the tenant
cannot in an action on a covenant to repair recover for an injury to
himself or family from the ruinous condition of the thing leased.
Shick v. Fleishner, 26 Ap. Div. (N. Y.) 210. Under the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, such .Ajury is not the normal result of such
breach, which is only that the tenant will use the thing leased until
repairs are made, or will be forced to have them made at his own cost.'
Nor are there usually any circumstances known to both at the time the
c.venant to repair is made which brings within the defendant's view
,he probability that the tenant will wrongfully continue to use the
structure unrepaired. The lessor, being out of possession, can only
know of the need of internal repair through notice from the tenant.
Before the lessor need make repairs, therefore, the tenant must know
'he condition of the thing, and if its condition render its use dangerous,
the lessor need not expect him to continue to use it; if danger is not
probable, the injury sustained is not expectable.
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in which archaic conceptions persist by reason of the con-
servative attitude of the courts to questions of this sort.30
In addition, considerations of public policy lead the courts
to look with disfavor on any obligations which tended to
restrain the free alienation of property."'
The cases dealing with the effect of a sale of real prop-
erty are few in number. In the cases of Blunt v. Aiken 
3 2
and Harper v. Phner 33 directly opposite decisions were ren-
dered upon practically the same state of facts. In each the
defendant had erected a dam upon his land to a height
which caused an overflow upon the land of the plaintiff.
In both the defendants had aliened the land; in both the
same English cases were cited. In Blunt v. Aiken it was
held that by the sale the defendant had relieved himself
from all liability for any injury which occurred after the
transfer. In Harper v. Plumer it was held that the defend-
ant, having created the nuisance, remained liable for its
injurious effects until it was removed. Blunt v. Aiken was
qualified in Waggoner v. Jernzaine 34 by holding that where
the vendor had sold with a warrarty he remains liable, and
in Conhocton Stone Road v. Thr Railroad,35 Lott, C. C.,
treats Waggoner v. Jermaine as having entirely overruled
Blunt v. Aiken, and as holding that "an original wrong-
doer, notwithstanding alienation, remains liable for the
damages occasioned by the continuance of the nuisance sub-
sequent to the conveyance," and such, he says, "is a part
of the rule in Penruddock's Case," 36 itself one of the cases
relied upon in Blunt v. Aiken. This latter case, therefore,
In which, too, the courts have, perhaps, been unconsciously influ-
enced by thb. fact that they themselves sprang from the landholding
cases, and so were inclined to free landowners of onerous liability at
the earliest possible moment.
'It can be readily seen that if the obligations of prooerty owners
were continued after the benefits of ownership were rone, a would-be
vendor would think twice before parting with the property for whose
condition he still remained liable. "Public policy does not demand
that such clogs on alienation should be imposed by construction."
Dean, J., 18z Pa. 89.
i5 Wendell, 52=
i N. H. 69.
33 Denio, 306.
51 N. Y. 573, at page 593.
"9 Rep. so a.
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can scarcely be said to be authority to-da 2 even in the court
which decided it, and there seems little ;oubt that the de-
cision in Harper v. Pluncr correctly relesents the effect of
the early English cases cited in it.
It was decided in Pahnore v. Morris Tvskcr Co. 37 that
all liability for non-repair of a ruinous gate passed to the
vendee together with the title and possession of the premises
in which it was sitrated, even though the injury occurred
so soon after the transfer that the vendee had no opportunity
to repair.
"This is not a letting of the land to a tenant," 38 said
Dean, J., "it is an absolute sale whereby the owner divests
himself of title and all ' ight to re-entry for repairs or for
any other purpose; and with his surrender of possession
all the duties incident to ownership were at an end" and
were transferred to the vendee. Now, while Blunt v. Aiken
was cited with approval, the case may be supported irre-
spective of the point involved therein, nor is it necessarily
in conflict with Phner v. Harper. It is the obligations
incident to ownership which are transferred with it, just as
feudal duties and services were transferred by the alienation,
with the lord's consent, of the fee out of which they arose, the
duty to repair being one of these duties passed to the vendee,
"and he became answerable to the public for neglect in its
performance." In Phner v. Harper it was the liability
of the creator of an injurious condition to answer for all
the natural consequences of his act, which was held to con-
tinue after title had passed from him.
The latter had no real connection with the ownership of
the land. The act, while committed upon the land, could
as well have been committed by a trespasser, a licensee or
tenant, as by the owner. The liability depends upon an
act wrongful by whomsoever done, and does not depend on
ownership or possession, and there seems, therefore, no rea-
son why, simply because the wrongdoer happens to be the
"182 Pa. 82.
Checthain v. Hampson, 4 T. R. 318, cited in the opinion, was a case
of landlord's liability to repair fences after lease.
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owner, his liability should be terminated by the alienation
of the scene of his wrong. Where, on the contrary, the
injury results not from an active misfeasance in itself wrong-
ful, but from a failure to perform an affirmative duty arising
out of the ownership and possession of propertyj the obli-
gation would be transferred by alienation together with all
attendant liability. So where the vendor has merely allowed
a nuisance created by his predecessor in title to remain upon
the land, and has transferred it to his'vendee, his liability
for its continuance, arising, as it does, from his ownership
and enjoyment of the land with its appurtenant nuisance,
would undoubtedly cease with alienation.39  1--
All the cases which hold a vendor of real estate liable for
the creation of a condition thereon which is a source of prob-
able future injury have dealt with conditions the effects of
which extend beyond the land.
40
It has been seen-Ist, that all obligations incident to
' Whether in Panore v. Morris Tasker Co. the ruinous condition
of the gate might not have been properly held to be a defect created
by the misconduct of the vendor, by the non-performance of an obli-
gation which undoubtedly rested upon him until the moment of trans-
fer of possession rather than as the result of a breach of the obliga-
tion to repair, which, having passed out of him by the sale, was in the
vendee when the gate fell, is perhaps open to doubt. That the condi-
tion was patent and that the vendee took possession with knowledge
or means of knowledge that a danger existed which if not immediately
repaired, or even before repairs could be made, might cause injury
and liability, induced the court to hold that he had accepted the land
with all the obligations and liabilities attendant upon its existing
condition.
' How far the rule contained in Fox v. Buffalo Co. would be ex-
tended to a case where a defect has been created unsuitinv structures
upon real estate for a purpose for immediate use for which they are
sold has not been determined. It may be at least said that in such case
the defect must be latent. Whether it is necessary that it is known
to and concealed by the vendor is more doubtful. On principle, this
should not be necessary. The reason why either the lease or sale of
structures internally defective in the absence of fraud is not wrong-
ful, is because, as a rule, there is no reason to anticinate that the land
or structure, if capable of many uses, will be used for a purpose for
which it is unfit, or if peculiarly adapted for any particular use will
be put to it until inspected and rendered safe for such use. Where,
however, a structure is sold for an immediate use for which on its
face it appears fit, such immediate use is to be anticipated, and where
the vendor has himself created the structure and has received an
enhanced price because of its availability for the snecial purpose, it
would seem that he should, under Fox v. Buffalo and Barrett v.
Ontario Beach Co., remain liable even after alienation.
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ownership are transferred with it; 2d, but that liability for
the wrongful creation of a nuisance upon the land is not
terminated by alienation; 3d, in addifion it is intimated in
Robbins v. Jones that a lessor may be liable even for internal
defects if fraud on his part at the time of the lease be shown,
and in Palnore v. Morris Tasker Co., Dean, J., says: "Ii
a grantor conceals from the grantee a defect in a structure
known to him alone and not discoverable by careful inspec-
tion, he may be held liable though out of possession," and
there appears to be no reason why his liability should not
extend to the concealment of interior defects rendering the
structure unsafe for a use for which it is manifestly de-
signed.
Turning now to p.rsonal property: The only obligation
arising out of posses.;ion of personal property is to keep it
in safe custody if it "je dangerous unless carefully guarded.
Such obligation woufd undoubtedly pass by transfer of pos-
session. The obligation to keep the property in safe con-
dition is upon him who not merely is in possession, but who
uses it, or upon him who, while not in actual possession,
supplies it for use for his own purposes. Interest in and
benefit from the use raises the duty to take care that it is fit
for the particular purpose for which, while in his possession,
he uses it, or to see that it is fit for use when he supplies it,
and so parts with the possession and the ability to control its
future condition.
Now, where the article is sold, the sale normally exhausts
all the vendor's interest in its future use. While immediate
availability for a particular use may constitute its principal
value, may alone render it salable, such benefit as may accrue
therefrom is realized by the sale-it is immaterial to the
vendor whether the vendee uses it at all after he buys it.41
The benefit and interest are too remote to impose any obli-
gation upon the vendor to take affirmative precautions to
If the vendor of a patented machine retained a royalty thereon
proportionate to the use of it, it is submitted that there would be an
interest sufficiently direct to raise an obligation to take care that the
machine was when sold fit for use; though no case has been found
raising this precise point.
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ascertaik- that an article is fit for its normal use. Liability,
if any, must be sought elsewhere.
It is quite obvious that from the contract of sale With its
stipulations, whether warranties or conditions as to the char-
acter, quality, or condition of the thing sold, no duty can
arise save towards persons parties to the contract, by or on
behalf of whom the consideration is to be paid.
42
One not a party to a contract can recover for an act or
omission, which is also a breach of contract, where, and
only where, "there has," as Baron Parke said in Longmeid
v. Holliday,43 "been a wrong for which he would have had
a right of action, though no such contract had been made."
The tendency of the courts to consider all obligations
owed between parties to a contract as solely and directly
consensual, 44 and so to import into the contract implied
terms which are nothing but recognitions of the obligations
already imposed by law upon their voluntary assumption
of specific relations for the protection of those whose safety
is dependent upon their careful conduct in the relations so
assumed, has led to great confusion. In this way a great
number of obligations have been bodily transported from
the law of tort to that of contract, and obligations imposed
by law for the protection of all who would be probably
injured by their breach have been conceived as being merely
creatures of the consent of the parties to the contract, as
private grants of private rights extending no farther than
the party to whom they were given.
45
'Great confusion has been introduced into the subject by the idea
that a recovery, if any, in such case must be based on the contract,
and involve a decision as to the right of persons not party to the con-
tract for whose benefit it is expressly or impliedly made to sue thereon.
"6 Exch. 76r.
"The modern and correct view is expressed by Henn Collins, AL R.,
in Clarke v. Army and Navy Store L. R (i9o3) i K. B., page x64:
"I do not agree with the contention that the contract of sale sweeps
into itself all collateral obligations of vendors arising out of that
sale... and that unless a duty to use care can be derived from
these terms, expressed or implied, it does not exist. I do not thifik
that the contract of sale, which is mainly concerned with the passing
of the property, necessarily exhausts all the obligations of the parties."
'To this confusion was due the long prevalent idea that the carrier
of passengers was liable only to a passenger who was a party to the
contract of carriage. See Lord Abinger's dictum in Winterbottom v.
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Modern tendency is to make the fundamental nature of
the obligation the test as to whether the action is founded
upon either tort or contract.4 If the obligation is one im-
posed by. law, either to act or to refrain from action, because
the performance of such obligation is usually necessary in
order to prevent probable injury to others, the obligation is
fundamentally one of the law of torts. An obligation to do
an act which will confer a benefit and whose breach will
cause no other injury than the loss of such expected benefit
is purely contractual. And since the law is highly general in
its imposition of duties, if precautions not generally required
by the relation of the parties are bargained for, though their
omission will deprive the party of the expected protection
and so may cause actual injury, the obligation being one not
usually required to be imposed, is an additional safeguard, a
benefit contractual in its essence.
47
The liability of the vendor of an injuriously defective
chattel (apart from that for breach of some stipulation of
the contract of sale, a liability wholly contractual) may
arise, Ist, out of misconduct as vendor; or, 2d, out of mis-
conduct in some prior position voluntarily assumed by him,
through which misconduct the defect is created.
Where the vendor's sole connection with the article is as
vendor, where even his possession of it is only for the pur-
pose of selling it, he can only be liable for some active mis-
conduct as vendor or for the breach of some duty imposed
by law upon the relation of vendor to purchaser.
Wright, supra, note 24. The obligation was thought to arise from a
stipulation to carry safely imnlied in the contract of carriage. This
particular fallacy has been completely exploded. Marshall v. R. R., Ir
Com. B. 665; Foulkes v. R. R., L. R. 5 C, P. D. 157; Derby v. R. R.,
14 How. 468. However, so latc as 1866 Willes, J., in Indamaur v.
Dames, was forced to state what appears to be sufficiently obvious:
that the duty of a shopkeeper towards his customers arose not out of
any implied contract, but from a use of the property for the owner's
purposes.
"So in Turner v. Stallibrass, L. IL x898, i Q. B. 56, it was held that
where the plaintiff showed a bailment of a horse to the defendant upon
which at common law was imposed a duty of careful custody, an action
for the breach thereof was founded upon a tort, although the defendant
had expressly agreed to keep the horse safely.
"'If this be.kept in mind, Baron Parke's statement becomes a valu-
able guide, instead of merely removing the difficulty one step further
back.
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When, however, he is not merely the vendor of the arti-
cle, but has made or repaired it or ii, any other way so
dealt with it that to his active misconduct, or lack of ade-
quate care and skill, the defective condition of the chattel
must be attributed, is he not also liable as the wrongful
creator of the injurious defect? It is submitted that he is,
and that his liability is established by the current of English
decisions and by the analogies of the cases just considered
which deal with the effect of the alienation of real property.
A vendor of real estate on which he has erected a nui-
sance does not terminate his liability by aliening the land
on which it is situate. But if the defect created can affect
only those coining upon the land, he is in the absence of
fraud freed by sale from further liability. Is a latent defect
in a chattel unfitting it for use for that purpose for which
it is designed, and for which its appearance indicates that
it is fit, analogous to a nuisance or to an interior defect in
a structure purely internal in its effects?
Personal property differs from real estate in many par-
ticulars. Real estate is fixed in location. The condition of
a structure thereon must be expected to affect the safety of
persons (and their property) who are brought into inevitable
contact with it in the exercise of their independent legal
rights. Chattels, on the contrary, being movable, are with
few, if any, exceptions, not in themselves dang-rous what-
ever their condition or character. They may become so by
being placed in some particular place. by negligent custody,
or by being put to some particular -use.
But while land is generally usable as land for many pur-
poses and" has a value apart from its immediate availability
for particular use, many chattels, and as highly specialized
appliances become more and more prevalent an increasing
number of them, are designed for one use only and are
valuable and salable only because immediately available for
this particular purpose.
While there may, therefore, be no reason to anticipate that
land or buildings thereon will be put at once to any partic-
ular use, but only that they will be used for such purposes
as they may be found suitable for, and that it will be put
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in safe conidition for whatever use the owner may choose
to put it, and so in the absence of fraud there may be no
wrong in selling or leasing land or buildings with interior
defects, there is no reason for similar anticipation in regard
to an article whose only value lies in its availability for
some one particular immediate use.
If, then, the distinction between liability for the creation
of injurious conditions whose effects are internal and those
whose effects are external to the land depends on the reason-
able anticipation of injury arising from them, a condition
of a chattel unfitting it for the use for which, on its face
it appears to be designed, would appear to be equivalent to
a condition of real estate injurious to neighboring owners
and travellers on adjacent highways.
While there is no good reason for allowing a sale of a
defective chattel to terminate the liability of him who created
it while an alienation of a structure in itself a nuisance
does not; in either case the nuisance or defect must have
been wrongfully created either by active misconduct or by
the breach of some positive obligation imposed as an inc-
dent to the assumption of some particular relation to the
public or some class thereof of which the plaintiff injured
is a member.
Where the vendor is also one engaged as his trade or
business, in the manufacture of such articles, he has, it is
submitted, assumed by engaging in it a duty to exercise it
competently.48 This obligation to exercise a calling com-
petently is of great antiquity, long antedating the discovery
that by the action of assumpsit executory parol contracts
might be enforced. - So early as 1537 Sir Anthony Fitz-
herbert in his abridgment, "De Novel Natura Brevium," 4 9
laid it down as a principle of the common law that "it i
the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and
The instances given by Parke, B., irt Lon gmeid v. Holliday of the
right of persons not parties to contracts to rccover for what is also
a breach thereof, are largely instanccs of the non-performance of
obligations of this nature-apothecaries, surgeons, carriers, etc.
" Writ de Trespass sur le Case, page 94 D, which Lord Coke calls
"An exact work exquisitely penned."
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truly as he ought." So in Y. B. 3 Hen. VI, 36, pl. 33
(A.D. 1425), Martin, J., says: "If he (the millvright)
has made a mill which is wholly spoiled and bad, a writ of
trespass lies." And in Y. B. 2o Hen. VI, 34, pl. 4, Paston,
J., says: "As in the case of a carpenter taking upon him-
self to make me a house of such a length and such a width
and such a height, which he (does) but he makes an error
in (joining) or some such way which is outside the cove-
nant., Now action of covenant fails me, because he has
kept all his covenants, and yet I shall have an action of
trespass on the case, because he has done badly. ° This
obligation to exercise one's art sufficiently well to avoid
causing injury long ariiedated the implication of warran-
ties or conditions that the article should be properly made.
In covenant there was no room for such implication of
warranty, even had such been possible in a simple contract;
if the thing granted was given, the covenant was satisfied.
Anyone injured must look for a remedy to an action on
the case. The duty to do work in a workmanlike way does
not originate in a promise or warranty implied in fact. It
is a duty imposed by law as the price of engaging in any
business whose unskilful exercise will probably be injurious
to the legal rights of others.
The instances of liability for the misperformance of a
contract to anyone not privy thereto, given by Baron Parke,
are instances of this obligation, and show that, like all duties
imposed by law, it is not limited to the parties to the con-
tract, but extends to all to whom actual injury is threatened
by its non-performance.
In Everard v. Hopkins 51 Lord Coke puts this case: "If
"This is an instance constantly given of an admitted action on the
case for misfeasance apart from covenant, and constantly occurs in
similar language, see also Y. B. 21 Hen. VI, 55, pl. 12, per Bingham, J.
Another common instance is that of a farrier who in shoeing a horse
pricks it and injures it. While it may be contended that a farrier was
exercising a public trade and was bound to shoe every horse offered
him, no such contention is possible in the case of a carpenter or mill-
wright. Such trades were purely private, and could be exercised or
not at pleasure.
"2 Bulst. 33i (1688), cited in the course of the argument of Long-
ineid v. Holliday by Parke, B.
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a master sends his servant to pay money for him upon the
penalty of a bund, and on his way a smith in shoeing doth
hurt his horse, and so by reason of this the money is not
paid, this being the servant's horse, he shall have an action
on the case for pricking of his horse, and the master also
shall have his action on the case for the special wrong which
he had sustained by the non-payment of his money occa-
sioned by this." Parke, B., makes the just comment that
the cause of action is certainly remote. It is very doubtful
whether to-day such a result would be considered a natural
consequence of the pricking of the horse. It, however,
shows that a person who engaged in the business of a far-
rier was, in the opinion of Lord Coke, liable for misfeasance
in his business towards all who might be injured thereby.
In Pippin v. Shepard 52 there is a still stronger recognition
of the obligation of one practising a profession or business
to practise it competently. In that case the declaration
stated that the defendant was retained and employed for
a reward to attend to the hurts which the plaintiff had re-
ceived, and that he had unskilfully and improperly treated
the wound whereby the plaintiff was injured. It was urged
that there was no allegation that the plaintiff had retained
the defendant or by whom the reward was to be paid. It
was held that it was sufficient that the declaration should
state that the surgeon was employed for a reasonable reward
to attend the patient and that he entered upon the treatment.
Richards, C. B., said: "The defendant being a surgeon
undertakes to the public to cure wounds and other ailments.
It is sufficiently stated that the defendant undertook the
cure. Negligence and improper treatment are charged.
'The question is, to whom was injury done? From the
necessity of the thing the only person who can sustain an
action for damages for an injury done to the person of the
patient is the patient himself, although the surgeon may
not have been retained and employed by him to undertake
the cure." And Garrow, B., said: "In all cases of sur-
geons retained by any of the public establishments, it would
a ii Price, 411 (1822), cited by Parke, B.
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happen the patient would be without redress, for it could
hardly be expected that the governors of an infirmary could
bring an action against the surgeon employed by them to
attend the child of poor parents who may have suffered
from his negligence and inattention." Similarly, in Glad-
well v. Steggall,5 3 it was held that a plea to a declaration
stating that a plaintiff, an infant, had employed defendant
as surgeon to cure her, and that she had been injured by his
misfeasance, which set forth that the plaintiff did not employ
defendant, was bad, it being immaterial by whom the de-
fendant was employed. "The substance of the issue," said
Erskine, J., "presented by the declaration is that the defend-
ant was employed to cure the plaintiff, not that he was
employed by the plaintiff."
In Dalyell v. Tyrer 5' these cases were cited with approval,
the facts being as follows: One Hetherington, owner of a
ferry, hired for a day from the defendants a steam tug and
crew to assist in carrying his passengers across. He received
the fares, and paid the defendants for the use of the tug. It
was held that the defendants were liable to the plaintiff, a
passenger, for an injury sustained by the breaking of a part
of the tackle. Earle, J., said: "If Hetherington pays the
defendants for the use of the ship, and they do so carry him,
the plaintiff, are they not retained for hire and reward to
carry the plaintiff?" This was a case in which, therefore,
the defendants were not acting gratuitously but for reward
in the course of their business, as shipowners engaged in
the carrying the plaintiff, and were therefore bound to him
to exercise due care in his carriage.
In addition, in the case of Marshall v. York and
Newcastle R. R. "I the carrier's liability to one not privy
to the contract of carriage was rested directly by Williams,
J., on the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly
as he ought, citing Fitzherbert.
In all of these cases the recovery was based upon the
breach of an obligation existing at common law upon the
U5 B. N. C. 733; E. C. L R., vol. xxxvii, cited by Parke, B.
"FE. B. and E. 898, 96 F_ C. L. R.
"Supra, ix C. B. 665.
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various defendants to practise their trades or professions
competently and carefully, and not upon any term in the con-
tract of employment expressed or implied. The obligation,
therefore, was not restricted to the parties to the contract of
employment (for in each case there was a contract of employ-
ment to which the plaintiff was not a party), but extended to
all to whom injury was threatened by carelessness therein.
Two comparatively recent cases illustrate the application of
this principle and its limitations. In Parry v. Smith 56 the
defendant, a gasfitter, employed by the owners of a house to
repair a gas-meter in the cellar, made a temporary connection
and the plaintiff, a housekeeper, employed by the owner,
having occasion to go into the cellar with a lighted candle,
was injured by an explosion of gas which had escaped
through the temporary connection. On the part of the de-
fendant it was contended that to entitle him to recover, the
plaintiff must show privity of contract with the defendant,
a public nuisance created by the defendant, or fraud, mis-
representation, or concealment. It was held, however, that
the plaintiff could recover, Lopes, J., saying: "The plain-
tiff's right is founded on a duty which attaches in every
case where a person is using or dealing with a wholly dan-
gerous thing, which, unless managed with the greatest care,
is calculated to cause injury to bystanders. A breach of
this duty is a misfeasance, independent of contract." This
case, on its facts, is an instance of the obligation of one
exercising a trade in the course of which, from its dangerous
nature, injury would result unless properly exercised, to
exercise it carefully.
5 7
The last case on its facts was one of a person exercising
a calling in the course of which, from its dangerous nature,
injury would result unless properly carried on. The case
of Collis v. Selden 58 would seem to mark the limits of this
L R- 4 C. P. D. 32_-
"Had the defendant not been a gasfitter exercising his calling, but
a volunteer who had made the temporary fitting gratituously, it is
submitted that a different question would have-been presented and a
different result reached..
" RL  3 C.: P. 49 (868). .
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principle. In this case the declaration alleged that the de-
fendant had carelessly hung a chandelier in a public house,
knowing that the plaintiff and others were likely to be
therein, and the plaintiff being lawfully therein was in-
jured. On demurrer, it was held that the declaration was
bad. It is to be noted that there is no allegation here
of the character of the defendant; from all that appears,
he may have been the owner of the propelty, a tenant, a
gasfitter, or a mere volunteer. Neither is there any alle-
gation as to the plaintiff save that he was lawfully upon
the premises. Now, had the plaintiff been a bare licensee,
the owner himself would have owed him no duty other than
to warn him of any danger known to him, and there is no
allegation that the defendant was aware of the defective
condition of the chandelier. It does not appear that the de-
fendant had as in the course of his business and for a reward
hung the chandelier in question, "nor," as Willes, J., says,
is there any allegation that the chandelier was in its nature
dangerous or likely to do damage or that it was so hung as to
be dangerous to persons frequ~enting the house." If the case
stands in substance for anything, it is that there is no duty
of careful artisanship unless danger is probable from a care-
less exercise of the defendant's trade.
59
The English cases from that in Year Book and Everhard
v. Hopkins down to Parry v. Smith recognize and enforce
the rule stated in general terms by Fitzherbert, that" Every
artificer must exercise his trade rightly as he ought." Nor
are. they instances of exceptional or anomalous liability
arbitrarily held to be incident to certain specific trades and
professions. Some of them deal with trades which are in
their nature quasi public trades, the exercise of which is
essential to the public-public utilities in the broad sense
'In Parry v. Sinith the case is distinguished upon this last ground,
that the defendant was not dealing with a thing in its nature dangerous
(if the work were not properly done), and that in Parry v. Smith he
was so dealing. In Heaven v. Pender, Brett, M. R., treats it as a case
in which the declaration was bad because there was no allegation that
the plaintiff had come upon the premises as a guest. Take it at its
best, the declaration is vague, and the case can be scarcely said to stand
for anything other than a declaration so vaguely worded fails to dis-
close any cause of action.
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of the term, trades which must be exercised if the public
offer themselves as patrons; not merely properly exercised,
if at all. But while carriers of goods and passengers may
fall within this class, the cases, as has been seen, include
many trades which have no such public character.
All, however, possess certain common characteristics, they
are trades or professions from which, unless carefully prac-
tised, injury may be expected to result to those upon whom
they are practised, or to the public generally, or some class
thereof. He who engages in such a trade for gain assumes
as an incident to its practice the duty to practise it compe-
tently. In George v. Skivington 59 a the defendant, an apoth-
ecary, had sold a hairwash, which he had himself manu-
factured, to the husband of the plaintiff, who was injured
by the use of it, it being unfit for use as a hairwash.
Now, the making and sale of drugs, though in this case
done by an apothecary, was originally an integral part of
the functions exercised by physicians. Until quite recently
nearly every medical practitioner made and sold the drugs
he prescribed. There could be no doubt that had the de-
fendant been a physician who had prescribed and made the
hairwash, the case would have fallen under the direct author-
ity of Pippin v. Sheppard and Gladwell v. Steggall, nor could
he have escaped liability because the particular phial of medi-
icine had been sold and delivered by him and paid for in
addition to his fee for treatment. When the functions of
physicians were divided and a part thereof fell to the apothe-
caries, this part, of course, carried with it the incidental
duties which previously attached to it,O and so though to-
day the trades and professions of apothecary and physician
and surgeon have become distinct and separate, there is no
reason why each should not retain the obligations originally
imposed on the parent professions of which each is but a
part. However, the court did not base their decision upon
the obligation of apothecaries as a separate trade, or as
exercising a part of the original profession of physicians,
"L. P_ 5 Ex. z.
"In fact, the very instance of liability to one not party to the
contract given by Parke, B., in Lo-igmeid v. Holliday, is that of an
apothecary who administered improper medicines to his patients.
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but upon the broad ground that those who makc an article
to be sold for an immediate particular use, on the faith of
it appearance of fitness therefor, must take due care in its
manufacture. Cleasby, B., said: " It is alleged that the
defendant himself manufactured this wash with ingredients
known only to him, and that he held it out to be of a certain
quality and that it was not of that quality, that he knew
it was purchased for the purpose of being used by the female
plaintiff. Under the circumstances, I think there was a
duty imposed on him to use due and ordinary care in its
manufacture, and a breach of that duty. The two things
concur, negligence and injury flowing therefrom." Kelley,
C. B., said: "It is not necessary to enter into the question
of warranty, because the contract of sale is only alleged by
way of inducement, tne cause of actioii being for an injury
caused to the wife of the purchaser by reason of an article
sold for her use turning out to be unfit for the purpose for
which it was sold. I think that, quite apart from any ques-
tion of warranty, there was a duty on the defendant to use
ordinary care in compounding this wash. Unquestionably,
there was a duty towards the purchaser, and it extends to
the person for whose use the vendor knew the compound
was purchased. Longmieid v. Holliday is distinguishable
because there was there found bona fides and no negligence
on the part of the vendor."
Thus it has been seen that Fitzherbert's rule is applied-
ist, where the injury is done by some careless act or omis-
sion in the direct practice of the defendant's calling upon
the very person injured, as in Pippin v. Shepard, Dalyell
v. Tyrer, and Marshall v. R. R.
2d. Where the injury is the indirect, though natural, con-
sequence of the improper performance of work on the prop-
erty of the person injured, Y. B. 3 Hen. VI, 36, pl. 33, and
2o Hen. VI, 34, pl. 4; or of. another, Everhard v. Hopkins,
Parry v. Smith.
3d. Even where in the course of his trade or profession
the defendant makes and puts on the market an article which
is so incompetently made as to unfit it for the use for which
on its face it is designed. George v. Skivington.
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Against these decisions stand only dicta, of eminent
judges, it is true, but still mere dicta.
In Francis v. Cockrell,"' Martin, B., says: "I consider
(the contractor who erected the stand) stood in too remote
a position from the plaintiff to be liable to an action by him.
The law of England looks at proximate liabilities as far
as is possible and endeavors to confine liabilities to the par-
ties immediately concerned. It is apprehended that it would
be impossible to contend that a person who had erected a
building strictly according to his contract would be respon-
sible to a stranger who happened to go on it if it be found
to be unfit for its purpose."
It may, however, be said that the proximity which
determines the existence of an obligation to act or refrain
from action depends upon the reasonable probability of in-
jury to the obligee if such duty is disregarded. That which
determines the liability for the consequences of the default
once established depends upon the unbroken sequence of
events, whereby unassisted, save by natural causes or the
usual customary action of men or animals under the con-
ditions created, the wrong works out its injurious tenden-
cies to their natural end. Proximity in the sense that the
parties are dealing directly with one another, that they are
brought consciously face to face, has- never been regarded
as necessary. That the stewards of the race-track put the
stand to the very use for which it was designed does not
break the chain of proximate cause between the contractors'
default, if any existed, and the spectator's injury, nor could
it be contended that the stewards' act was anything but the
usual action of one for whom such a stand was built. Surely,
the contractor is as proximate to the spectator as the apothe-
cary in George v. Skivington to the wife of the customer,
the spectator as immediately concerned with the contractor's
conduct, as the housekeeper in Parry v. Sinith was with the
" L R. s Q. B. soi, page 55o. The stewards of a race meeting were
held-liable for the fall of a stand negligently constructed by the con-
tractors. There was no personal negligence or knowledge of the
defect on the defendant's part, and the plaintiff was a spectator who
had paid for admission.
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way in which the gasfitter did his work. In neither case
did the parties deal with one .another directly. Just as, in
Parry v. Smith, the defendant must, had he thought, have
realized that persons might come into the cellar, and so
would be dependent for their safety on his care, and as, in
George v. Skiington, the defendant knew that the customer
was going to give the hairwash to his wife to use, and so
she only was concerned with its preparation, so here the
contractor must have known that the stand was not erected
for the private use of the stewards, but would be thrown
open to the public, whose safety would depend on the man-
ner in which they built it. Had the defect been open and
patent, or had the plans as presented by the stewards been
faithfully carried out,G2 there would have been reason to
say that the injury was the result of the stewards' misuse
of a defective stand, or their error in not designing one fit
for the number of persons they wished to accommodate.
Then the act of the stewards would have intervened between
the defendant's act and the injury, and itself been the sole
proximate cause thereof.
The statements of Rolfe, B., and Lord Abinger, C. B.,
in Winterbottom v. Wright have already been examined.
There remains the following dictum of Willes, J.,63 to
whose opinion, however expressed, the highest deference is
due. "There would be no end of actions if we should hold
that a person having once done a piece of work carelessly
could independently of honesty of purpose be fixed with
liability by reason of bad material or insufficient fastening.
Take the case of a man building a house; his work-people
scamp the work, and five or six years after, through a high
' It would appear that Baron Martin considered the case as one
where the stand fell, not because of the contractor's carelessness, but
because badly planned, probably by some architect indeoendently em-
ployed by the stewards. If so, no doubt the contractors were not
responsible, having been guilty of no wrong of commission or omis-
sion. They are not bound to judge of the propriety of the thing
they make for the purposes for which it is to be used, they are enti-
tled to believe it will be put only to such use as it may be fitted for.
The facts as stated in L. R. Q. B., page 187--i.e., that the stand was
negligently and improperly erected and was insufficient for the purpose
for which it was erected,--perhaps admit of this view.
" Collis v. Selden, Q. B. 3 C P. 497, see supra, page 298.
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wind, the chimney-stack falls and injures a person with
whom he has no contract, to whom he owes no duty, and
against whom he cannot have been guilty of any fraud. To
hold him liable to an action at the suit of the injured person
would be going far beyond anything which has been decided
in our law." The case of Parry v. Smith is direct authority
that one who has done work carelessly is liable to anyone
injured to whom danger is threatened, and that honesty of
purpose is no defence. Given an injury caused by a breach
of duty towards the person injured, it is surely not the policy
of the law to discourage action to give compensation, nor
would a builder who had built with bad materials or himself
fastened his work insecurely be protected. So early as the
time of Henry VI it was recognized as a builder's duty to
build carefully quite apart from his conTract, nor would mere
lapse of time terminate his liability; it miight, and very prob-
ably would, make it difficult to trace the injury to the ormig-
nal wrongdoing of the builder, difficult to tell whether the
cnimney fell from some original defect or from subseuuent
lack of repair, especially where, as in the example given, it
required a high wind to bring it down; and it is probably
this difficulty of proof which has led to the entire absence
of authority on the subject. If the injury were once traced
to the defendant's misconduct, the mere fact that his wrong
had for years produced no ill results would not make the
plaintiff's injury any less the proximate legal consequence
of it.-4  Nor does it appear, save by inference, that the
builder spoken of was not, both at the time of the building
and of the fall, the owner of the structure, and that the per-
son injured was not a traveller on an adjacent highway.
If such were the case, there seems little doubt that a recovery
might be had, no matter how much time had elapsed between
the wrong and the injury. However, since in such case the
Compare Agnew, C. J., in Elkins v. McKean, 79 Pa., page 502.
"The wrongdoer cannot claim exemption for liability for his terrible
wrong because he has sent it through many hands. The length of its
passage may create a doubt of its identity, or that it was sent on its
mission of destruction with a full purpose and knowledge of its-dan-
gerous qualities, but the facts being established, he cannot escape the
consequences of his crime against society."
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builder, as occupier, " would owe a duty" to the traveller,
it is fair to infer that the builder intended is one who has
built the house for another on that other's land, and has
tui ned it over to him. Still, even then, it by no means fol-
lows that the plaintiff is not a traveller on a highway; if
so, a building so constructed would be a public nuisance
thereto, and the builder would be liable for its creation, 5
for surely one who creates a nuisance is not exempt from
liability for an injury caused by it because for a long time
it has harmed no one.
What Willes, J., seems to have in mind is the hardship
that a person honestly doing all he can should be liable for
the acts and omissions of his servants which he is powerless
to prevent. However, the same hardship exists in all cases
where a master is badly served by his servants. He himself
may be harmed, but he must also answer for injuries caused
to others, since the servant is acting for his benefit and about
his business. As between him and the person injured, both
innocent of personal misconduct, it is surely just that he who
has received the benefit should bear the burden, and that the
builder who had built the house for reward, and in the exer-
cise of his trade, should be responsible for the imperfections
of the instruments he uses to carry on his business.
Any other rule would tend to encourage careless work-
manship, and while it may well be the policy of the law to
encourage trade and commerce, it is quite a different thing
to encourage carelessness therein. To make the public bear
the risk of the manner in which trades and professions are
carried on would be to throw upon them a burden without
any corresponding benefit, and to remove from those who
benefit by the exercise of such trades and professions every
incentive to care.
To protect the builder from the consequences of using bad
material is to excuse him from a conscious personal mis-
conduct unless the material was bought of a reputable dealer
and the defect therein was latent. In such case there would
be no misconduct in any event, either on his part or on
'See Parke, B., in Longmeid v. Holliday, supra, page 284.
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that of those who were his servants engaged upon his busi-
ness for his benefit, and to require him to be liable for such
injury would be to make him a guarantor as against all
the world of the soundness of that which he had constructed.
This, no doubt, would go far beyond anything decided in
the English law, and would be impolitic in the extremne,
imposing, as it would, a duty of which no care could insure
performance. It is submitted, however, that the cases, while
falling far short of imposing so unreasonable a burden, do
cast on everyone exercising a trade a duty to exercise it
carefully, both personally and through the servants whom
he employs therein. However, as Willes, J., says later in his
opinion that "the declaration should have shown that the
chandelier was dangerous in itself, or so hung as to be dan-
gerous," it may well be that he would agree, that where from
the nature of the work injury is probable, unless care be
taken, an obligation does arise to do that work carefully.
Where, however, the vendor is in no way responsible for
the creation of the defective condition of the article sold,
any liability on his part must rest upon some misconduct,
some act or omission, as vendor.
The vendor '6 as such, apart from the obligations created
by the contract of sale,.67 may become liable through active
or passive misconduct. In Langridge v. Levy it was held
that one who sold to a father a shotgun expressly for his
son's use, and represented it to be a Nock gun, a gun of
well-established reputation, when he knew it to be a cheap,
inferior, and unsafe gun, was liable to the son for injuries
sustained by its explosion While in his use.
In Clarke v. Arny and Navy Stores,8 the Court of Ap-
peals, Henn Collins, M. R., Romer and Mathew, LL. J.,
"This is a liability common to all who supply others with either
chattels or real property for immediate use, whether by sale, lease,
loan, or gift. The wrong consists of misconduct, the wilful, conscious
leading of another into a danger known only to the wrongdoer. See
Bramwell, B., in Southcote v. Stanly supra, paze 2A
'Henn Collins, M. R., in Clarke v. Army and Navy Stores (1903),
L R. i K. B. z55-164: "Independently of any warranty, a relation
arises out of the contract of sate between the vendor and purchaser
which imposes on the former a duty towards the latter.
C(r9o3) L R. i K B. xss.
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held that" Independently of any warranty a relation arises 69
out of the contract of sale between the vendor and pur-
chaser, which imposes on the former a duty towards the
latter-namely, the duty if there is some dangerous quality
in the goods sold of which he knows, but of which the pur-
chaser cannot be expected to be aware, to take reasonable
precautions in the way of warning to the purchaser that
special care will be requisite." 70 A tin of baking powder
known to be of such quality or so put up as to be explosive
was sold by the Army and Navy Stores, which merely
sold at retail. A rule known to the purchaser provided
that no warranties were to be given with the goods sold,
except by written authority of the management. Thus
all express warranties were excluded; the court, while re-
fusing to decide that such a rule would destroy all those
implied warranties which arise out of the act of sale,71 pre-
ferred to base their decision on the duty arising out of the
relation of vendor and purchaser.
Thus the vendor is bound not to misrepresent the quality
and condition of his goods either by express words or active
concealment. To do so would be actual, active fraud, for
which an action of case for deceit would lie. He is also
bound to disclose any quality or condition known by him to
render the goods dangerous for use if the purchaser cannot
be expected to discover it. This is a positive duty, for breach
of which an action on the case will lie. The conduct while
wrongful is not fraudulent; it is necessary not only that the
defect should be known, it must also be one which renders
the article proably unsafe for use.72 The obligation, since
And is created by it.
"Henn Collins, X R, page 164.
'Intimating that the rule only applied to collateral warranties in
addition to those arising out of the sale and the nature of the article
sold.
"In Lan gridge v. Levy there was some evidence that the defendant
knew not only that the gun was not made by Nocl, but also that it
was unsafe for use, and the jury so found; and Baron Parker through-
out his opinion emphasizes the defendant's knowledge of the unfitness
of the gun for use. However, it is submitted that in the action of
deceit, if the defendant leads another to act on a known false state-
ment, it is immaterial that he intended harm to result or even that
h6 should have realized that harm was a probable result of action on
the faith of the falsehood. That harm actually resulted from action
on the faith of the false statement is enough.
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it arises not out of the contract, but from the relation of
vendor, extends to all who may be expected to use it on the
faith of its deceptive appearance.
But the vendor is not bound to inspect the a tcles which
he sells in order to discover any possible defects which may
unfit them for use. In Longmcid v. Holliday " it was con-
tended that ignorance of a defect in the article sold which
could have been discovered by inspection was equivalent to
knowledge thereof. The declaration was clearly framed
on Langridge v. Lcvy, and the right of action alleged was
expressly based on the defendant's deceit. The defendant
was the vendor of lamps patented by him. The lamp in
question was sold to the husband of the plaintiff, and was
alleged to have been made of weak and insufficient materials,
and to have been cracked and leaky, and that in consequence
it exploded and injured the plaintiff. It was shown in evi-
dence that the defendant had not constructed the lamp him-
self, but had purchased the parts from third parties and
had them put together by others, and that he did not know
of the defective condition of the lamp sold, and had sold
it in good faith. The allegation of actual fraud not being
sustained, the action framed in deceit could not lie unless
there existed a duty to know, the breach of which would
be legally equivalent to knowledge. 4 It was held that there
being no actual fraud shown and "no misfeasance towards
the plaintiff independently of the contract," she could not
recover. Parke, B., said: "There are other ca-es beside
those of fraud in which a third person, though not a party
to the contract, may sue for the damage sustained if it be
broken. These cases occur where there has been a wrong
done to that person for which he would have had a right
of action, though no such contract had been made," but he
"6 Exch. 76r.
UAs where goods are warranted, an action of deceit lay without
proof of the scienter, the warranty making it the duty of the defendant
to have the goods answer to it, and until the beginning of the nine-
teenth century the usual mode of recovering for breach of warranty
was in an action of deceit. The declaration, in Longrneid v. Holliday
was very closely analogous to such actions, and was in substance an
attempt to hold the defendant as a warrantor to all who might use the
article that it had been carefully inspected.
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holds that there is no actionable wrong in the absence of
any obligation contractually assumed in the mere transfer
of " an article not in its nature dangerous, but which might
become so by a latent defect entirely unknown, though dis-
coverable by the exercise of ordinary care even by the person
who manufactured it."
It is to be noticed that there was no allegation that the
defect was caused by carelessness of the defendant in its
manufacture. The evidence showed that he had purchased
the parts from third parties who were not alleged to be
incompetent, nor did he himself or by his servants put the
parts together; this, too, was done by .others not alleged to
be incompetent. The defendant, therefore, did not himself
or by-his servants create the defective condition, he was
not the maker, but the vendor merely; the case, therefore,
is authority only as to the obligation of a vendor to his ven-
dee arising out of tl.e act of transferring the title and pos-
session of property. To such a relation no higher duty
attaches than to the gratuitous transfer of an article, as by
gift or loan. The position of the defendant in each is that
of one transferring property to another for use for pur-
poses in which the transferrer has no further concern. This
case decides, at most, this: that in the absence of fraud or
conscious concealment of a known though latent defect, the
vendor's only liability is upon warranty express or implied,
which being purely consensual, can extend no further than
the vendee. It settles that there is no duty by a vendor, as
such, to inspect a chattel before he sells it, or even, if he has
had it made for him to sell, to inspect the materials pur-
chased from reputable dealers, or to personally superintend
the work of construction. If the defect is patent to inspec-
tion, the vendee is bound to notice it, and his is the primary
duty to see that an article he uses is fit for the use to which
he puts it. If the defect be latent even to inspectidn, no
recovery could be had unless upon the warranty. The
vendor's liability on his warranty does not arise by reason
of a failure to inspect, it is to answer if the article be not
as warranted, and he is liable though no inspection could
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have discovered the defect of even if he has subjected the
article to a rigorous examination.
It is intimated, in addition, that even though the vendor
himself manufactures the article, he is not bound to inspect
it before selling it. The case does not, however, in any
way decide that he is not bound to exercise care in its manu-
facture, or that a transfer of the property terminates his
liability for his misconduct or breach of duty, which has
resulted in the creation of a dangerously defective article.
As the declaration alleged no misconduct or carelessness
on the defendant's part in manufacture, and no bad faith
in the sale, the case, as Kelley, C. B., says of it in George
v. Skivington,75 decided only that "there being bona fides"8
and no negligence,7 7 no recovery could be had save on the
warranty."
In his opinion Parke, B., intimates that the duties of a
vendor are identical with those of a lender or donor of an
article. There is no doubt that the obligations arising out
of the act of transfer whether by lease, sale, loan, or gift,
whether of a chattel or real property, are the same. Mc-
Carthy v. Young 78 holds that one who lends to another a
ladder for a use in which that other was alone concerned was-
not liable, save for fraud or non-disclosure of defects known
to him but latent to the borrower. This is identical with
the decision in Gautret v. Egerton,79 that an occupier of real
property owed no duty other than these to a bare licensee.
But in that very case Willes, J., says: "Some wrongful act
or some breach of a positive duty must be shown" to consti-
tute actionable negligence. The only act wrongful in a
transferrer of property is fraud or non-disclosure of known
dangerous defects, which makes the act of transfer itself a
conscious leading of the transferee into a known danger.
No positive duty to see that the thing is fit for use can arise'
"L R. 5 Exch. x, infra, page 29g.
"As vendor.
"None as vendor, for there is no duty to inspect an article before
sale, none as manufacturer, for he did not manufacture the lamp.
"6 H. and N. 329.
"Supra, page 224.
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because the transferrer has no further interest in- the use
of the thing transferred; but where the article is not merely
loaned, but is actually made by the lender for the express
purpose of being so loaned and used, if he actually make
by his misconduct 80 a thing dangerous if used by the bor-
rower, and if the danger is latent when the article is loaned,
there would be active misfeasance antecedent to the loan,
and the case would fall under Corby v. Hill"1 rather than
Gautret v. Egerton.
Francis H. Bohen.
While in Longmeid v. Holliday, Parke, B., intimates that the ven-
dor is not liable for failing to use care to discover a latent defect, even
if himself the manufacturer, still this does not really touch the present
point, which concerns the liability, not for a failure to discover a
defect, but for wrongfully creating it.
'Supra, page 224.
"Supra, page 224.
